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HARMONIZING PLURAL SOCIETIES: THE
CASE OF LASALLIANS, FAMILIES,
SCHOOLS—AND THE POOR
PATRICK MCKINLEY BRENNAN †
“[I]s the life of the society to be conceived as inherent or derived?
Does the Church exist by some living force, with powers of selfdevelopment like a person; or is she a mere aggregate, a fortuitous
concourse of ecclesiastical atoms, treated it may be as one for
purposes of convenience, but with no real claim to a mind or will
of her own, except so far as the civil power sees to invest her for the
nonce with a fiction of unity?” 1
“By reason of its identity, therefore, the Catholic school is a place
of ecclesial experience, which is moulded in the Christian
community. However, it should not be forgotten that the school
fulfils its vocation to be a genuine experience of the Church only if
†
John F. Scarpa Chair in Catholic Legal Studies and Professor of Law,
Villanova University School of Law. The germ of this paper was the author’s keynote
address at the marvelous June 2005 conference on “school choice” that was
sponsored by the Brothers of the Christian Schools at Mont La Salle, Napa. For their
kind invitation and gracious hospitality, I am grateful to all of the Brothers,
especially Brother Stanislaus, as well as to their collaborators Jack Coons and Tom
Brady. For their penetrating comments on that occasion, I am grateful to Jesse
Choper, Steve Sugarman, and Michael Guerra. I am also grateful to Brothers
Edmond LaRouche, Michael McGinnis, Joseph Grabenstein, and George Van
Grieken for help of various kinds in connection with my preparation of this paper. A
special debt runs to Russell Hittinger; as the documentation herein attests, his work
on the history of modern Catholic social thought has had a unique role in opening
my eyes to new questions and directions. My thanks are also due to members of the
audiences at St. John’s University School of Law and the University of St. Thomas
School of Law in Minnesota where I presented versions of this paper in the Spring of
2006; the comments of Susan Stabile, Larry Winer, and Nelson Tebbe at St. John’s,
and Elizabeth Schiltz, Thomas Mengler, Charles Reid, and Greg Sisk at St. Thomas
were especially helpful. I dedicate this paper to Brother R. Columban, F.S.C. At 92
years of age, he remains a Brothers’ Brother, full of love for the Church, the
Institute, youths of every background, and, above all, the Lord whom he serves in
joy.
1 JOHN NEVILLE FIGGIS, CHURCHES IN THE MODERN STATE 40 (Thoemmes Press
1997) (1914).
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it takes its stand within the organic pastoral work of the
Christian community. . . . In the life of the Church, the Catholic
school is recognised above all as an expression of those Religious
Institutes which, according to their proper charism or specific
apostolate, have dedicated themselves generously to education.” 2
INTRODUCTION: AFTER MUNERA
The current system of support and supervision of primary
and secondary schools across the United States is grossly out of
line with primary principles of Catholic social thought. More
specifically, the American educational apparatus stands square
in the way of non-rich families fulfilling their mission and,
coordinately, of the Church’s fulfilling hers. These are the
principal claims for which I shall argue here, and I shall do so
from the angle of a concrete work of the Catholic Church in the
United States today. It was the foundering of this particular
work that concentrated my attention on how families and schools
disappear in the sea that dissolves societies or, in a more
technical idiom, group persons. “One of the mottoes of modern
absolutism,” F.W. Maitland observed, has been that “the absolute
State face[s] the absolute individual.” 3 The Church, however,
joins Maitland in reminding the absolutizing state that “[g]rouppersonality is no purely legal phenomenon.” 4
Rather than on group-personality, recent literature
developing the implications of Catholic social thought for
education reform in the U.S. has tended to focus on the principle
Subsidiarity in turn has frequently been
of subsidiarity. 5
understood, in the education-reform debate as elsewhere, as a
2 PREFECT PIO CARD. LAGHI & ARCHBISHOP JOSÉ SARAIVA MARTINS, CIRCULAR
LETTER OF THE CONGREGATION FOR CATHOLIC EDUC. THE CATHOLIC SCHOOL ON
THE THRESHOLD OF THE THIRD MILLENNIUM ¶¶ 12–13 (1997), available at
http://www.vatican.va/roman_curia/congregations/ccatheduc/documents/rc_con_ccath
educ_doc_27041998_school2000_en.html.
3 F. W. MAITLAND, STATE, TRUST AND CORPORATION 66 (David Runciman &
Magnus Ryan eds., 2003).
4 Id. at 68.
5 See, e.g., Richard W. Garnett, The Right Questions About School Choice:
Education, Religious Freedom, and the Common Good, 23 CARDOZO L. REV. 1281,
1305–07 (2002); Michael P. Moreland, Subsidiarity, Localism, and School Finance, 2
J. OF CATH. SOC. THOUGHT 369, 369–70, 397–400 (2005); see also JOHN PAUL II,
PAPAL LETTER LETTER TO FAMILIES ¶ 16 (1994) (urging that the “mission of
education . . . always be carried out in accordance with a proper application of the
principle of subsidiarity”).
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directive toward devolution of power and responsibility from the
state to the smallest group that is capable of performing a
specific task. 6 A mandate for divestiture from above, subsidiarity
is celebrated as a check on the monopolistic tendencies of the
modern state; it is a plea for localism and doing things at the
lowest possible level. 7
The usually unspoken assumption of such subsidiarity
analysis seems to be that (legitimate) power starts at the top and
is allowed (or not allowed) to trickle down, based on someone’s or
a hegemonic group’s cost-benefit analysis; the power that decends
does so with no given specific, necessary destination. 8 In such a
tractionless environment, subsidiarity is malleable and easily
manipulated, and therefore unthreatening to all but the biggest
consolidators of power. 9 In the eyes of Catholic social thought,
6 See, e.g., ANTHONY S. BRYK, VALERIE E. LEE & PETER B. HOLLAND, CATHOLIC
SCHOOLS AND THE COMMON GOOD 45 (1993); TRACEY ROWLAND, CULTURE AND THE
THOMIST TRADITION: AFTER VATICAN II 61 (2005) (describing “the traditional
principle ‘subsidiarity,’ according to which decision-making authority should be
decentralized to the lowest level at which the decision can competently be made”);
Lucia A. Silecchia, Catholic Social Teaching and Its Impact on American Law: Some
Observations on the Past and Reflections on the Future, 1 J. OF CATH. SOC. THOUGHT
277, 301 (2004) (“[T]he Church preaches the principle of subsidiarity, consistently
teaching that problems should be resolved at the lowest level capable of effectively
doing so.”); cf. Robert K. Vischer, Subsidiarity as a Principle of Governance: Beyond
Devolution, 35 IND. L. REV. 103, 116 (2001) [hereinafter Vischer, Principle of
Governance] (“Subsidiarity is not a knee-jerk shunning of government authority . . . .
Rather, subsidiarity is a principled tendency toward solving problems at the local
level and empowering individuals, families and voluntary associations to act more
efficaciously in their own lives. In this regard, the focus is on fostering the vitality of
mediating structures in society.”). For the reasons developed infra text at notes 127–
34, subsidiarity, as understood in Catholic social teaching, does not “empower;”
rather, at least some of the time, it recognizes and gives effect to an anterior
distribution of ruling power.
7 See BRYK ET AL., supra note 6, at 45, 301–02; Vischer, Principle of Governance,
supra note 6, at 122–23.
8 Cf. Russell Hittinger, Social Pluralism and Subsidiarity in Catholic Social
Doctrine, PROVIDENCE: STUDIES IN WESTERN CIVILIZATION, at 59 (2002) [hereinafter
Hittinger, Social Pluralism] (“In papal teachings since Pius XI, subsidiarity is
proposed as a principle of non-absorption, not a principle that necessarily requires
devolution. As it is commonly understood, devolution is the opposite of subsidiarity.
For devolution presupposes either: (a) an ontological deficiency, measured by a kind
of cost-benefit analysis, or (b) that the central government rightly possesses a
plenary power that it has now decided to redistribute to other powers and
authorities.”).
9 See Moreland, supra note 5, at 369 (“A recurring theme in the literature on
subsidiarity is that the principle of subsidiarity is indeterminate, vague, and
ultimately unhelpful to the resolution of concrete legal and policy questions . . . . The
church’s own teaching documents contribute to this apparent uncertainty by
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however, subsidiarity does not govern—even if, per impossibile, it
could do such a thing—devolution of power from a top, central
locus.
Rather, subsidiarity governs relations in a world in which
ruling power has already been, at least in part, distributed in
munera. The defect of the typical subsidiarity analysis is that it
slights or denies subsidiarity’s necessary predicate or correlate,
the munus. The Latin word munus, of which the plural is
munera, is translated variously as function, gift, vocation, or
mission. 10 To recognize munera is to recognize that specific
functions have been (or should be) assigned to specific
individuals or specific societies. One can safely speculate that
the cause of the submersion of the concept of munus, or at least
part of that cause, is its irremediably pre-modern claims. The
Second Vatican Council, however, used the word munus at least
248 times, and the Catechism of the Catholic Church (1997) and
the Code of Canon Law (1983) have continued apace. 11
A semi-technical exposition of munera will be necessary, but
we can begin by observing that it has been a central thesis of the
philosophia perennis that every natural kind has a given
“function” or (in Greek) ergon. In the words of Aristotle, early in
the Nicomachean Ethics,
Have the carpenter, then, and the tanner certain functions or
activities, and has man none? Is he born without a function?
Or as eye, hand, foot, and in general each of the parts evidently
has a function, may one lay it down that man similarly has a
function apart from all these? What then can this be? 12

Aristotle follows this series of questions with a dialectic from
which he famously concludes that the function of man is an
activity of the soul according to a rational principle 13 —a thesis
speaking of subsidiarity as counseling devolution of authority in some circumstances
but centralization of authority in others.”).
10 THE POCKET OXFORD LATIN DICTIONARY 87 (James Morwood ed., Oxford
Univ. Press 1994).
11 Hittinger, Social Pluralism, supra note 8, at 55.
12 THE NICOMACHEAN ETHICS OF ARISTOTLE 13, I.7 1097b29 33 (Sir David Ross
trans., 1925).
13 See id. at 13–14, I.7 1097a33, 1098a29. While Aristotle’s central thesis is
clear, much of the important detail is controverted. See, e.g., H. H. JOACHIM,
ARISTOTLE: THE NICOMACHEAN ETHICS 50 (1951); RICHARD KRAUT, ARISTOTLE ON
THE HUMAN GOOD 312–57 (1989) (expanding on Aristotle’s function argument and
considering it in a larger context); Richard Kraut, The Peculiar Function of Human
Beings, 9 CAN. J. OF PHIL. 467, 467–78 (1979) (questioning and clarifying Aristotle’s
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that Thomas Aquinas took up and, as they say, baptized. In the
words of the twentieth-century Thomist Jacques Maritain (1882–
1973), the natural law of every natural kind is its “normality of
functioning.” 14
To the classical thesis on the function of natural kinds,
modern philosophy has not been kind—and the case is a fortiori
with respect to the related thesis that human societies or “group
persons,” not just individuals or parts thereof, come bearing
functions.
The Catholic Church, however, continues to teach—indeed,
has clarified and magnified her teaching—that not only
individual persons, but also human societies or “group persons”
bear distinct functions. As Russell Hittinger has shown, the
Church over the last century has developed her teaching on
human functionality, through a new a focus on and amplification
of the concept of munus. 15 Professor Hittinger opines that “the
idea of munus holds together the Aristotelian notion of ergon or
characteristic function with the more biblical concept of vocation
or mission.” 16 In refining the function thesis, the Church has
been responding to the uniquely modern claim that both human
individuals and human societies lack munera altogether. 17 In a
world without munera, anything goes and nothing is required.
By denying the existence of mandatory munera that precede
creation by the state, the totalitarian regimes of the twentieth
century robbed the basic human societies of their legal
personality, and having denied their right to exist, frequently
denied them opportunity to exist. In a world that respects
munera, as the Popes have reminded the world, individuals and
groups have work to do and gifts to exchange.
Although it conceals a totalitarian face, the contemporary
American educational apparatus is ruthless in its pitting of the
individual—or, rather, some individuals—against the putatively
sovereign state. Rich and middle-class families are at liberty to
transport their lucky children whithersoever they choose, but the
rest, people of low income and the poor, are compelled to meet

passage on the function of human beings).
14 JACQUES MARITAIN, MAN AND THE STATE 87 (1951).
15 See Hittinger, Social Pluralism, supra note 8, at 54–63.
16 Id. at 57.
17 See id. at 52–54.
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the state face to face in the confines of the neighborhood school. 18
Unlucky parents and children must take whatever the state
serves up in terms of education, no matter the violence to the
integrity of the family and its firmly held convictions. 19 An
educational apparatus that respected munera would allow the
family, and other implicated societies such as church and school,
to fulfill their respective functions, including education into the
truth as understood by family and church.
My own thinking on these questions has been concentrated,
as I mentioned, by a particular work, that of the Institute of the
Brothers of the Christian Schools. More commonly known today
as the De La Salle Christian Brothers, after their founder St.
John Baptist de La Salle (1651–1717), they were my teachers and
mentors when I was growing up in California. The germ of the
present paper grew out of the Brothers’ welcome invitation to join
a team assembled to consider some of the challenges and
opportunities the Brothers face today. The Brothers’ concrete
munus focused my considerations; conditions that might yet
allow it to be fulfilled are my concern. There is risk that the
narrative the Brothers made available to generations of
youngsters may soon have run its course in the United States.
Thriving throughout much of the world until a generation
ago, not least in the U.S., the Institute that La Salle founded in
France in 1680 is facing possible extinction in this country.
Although many (though by no means most) of the schools the
Brothers built in the U.S. remain open today, they are staffed
and administered almost exclusively by dedicated lay men and
women. La Salle’s Institute is disappearing before our eyes. Not
a soul entered the Brothers’ one remaining U.S. novitiate in
2005, and the novitiate class of 2004 ended with just two
members. Such numbers (of which zero is more common than
two) have come to be expected, and there is no terrestrial reason
to anticipate abrupt reversal. The Brother Archivist at La Salle
University (Philadelphia) reports that whereas there were 2,995
Brothers in the United States in 1965, today there are just 816.
Many among those 816 are over sixty years-old. The Brothers’
retirement communities swell to overflowing, as the active
18 JOSEPH
P. VITERITTI, CHOOSING EQUALITY: SCHOOL CHOICE, THE
CONSTITUTION, AND CIVIL SOCIETY 11–12 (1999).
19 See id. at 11 (noting that children from poor backgrounds have fewer
educational options than children from more comfortable backgrounds).
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communities dwindle and close. The result is that within a
generation or two, the United States could find itself without the
historically robust service of the Catholic Church’s largest
congregation of men devoted exclusively to teaching, and to
teaching youth specifically.
The passing of the Brothers takes on a special salience from
the fact that the Brothers have dedicated themselves and their
efforts, from the moment La Salle set to work, to “service of the
poor through education.” Many individuals and societies in the
Church serve the poor, and many serve as educators. To serve
poor children through Christian education, this was La Salle’s
enduring, and radiating, innovation; it is the Brothers’ distinctive
munus.
But yes, a thousand times yes: Today and in recent history,
the Brothers in the U.S. have been serving mostly middle-class
and rich children. La Salle himself insisted that the Brothers’
teaching be free, and, until a generation or two ago, the Brothers
in the U.S. were able to provide comparatively inexpensive
education, as well as ample scholarships for those in need of
them, thanks in part to the Brothers not collecting salaries. 20
The Brothers’ vowed poverty served the needs of children who
happened to be poor.
The shifting cultural and specifically economic realities of
today, however, have meant that schools that used to be widely
affordable increasingly are accessible only to the well-off. 21 Lay
teachers deserve a living wage. Lasallians have struggled
mightily to keep their schools accessible to poor and low-income
families, but, notwithstanding some impressive support from
benefactors, more and more poor children are unreachable by
those who have ardently sought to serve them.
No doubt, there are many and interrelated causes of their
shrinking numbers in the U.S. The bald and sad fact, however,
is that the Lasallians are losing ground in their fight to serve the
poor through education, because, increasingly, they cannot afford
to provide education to poor and low-income families. And when
20 In some places, including the one I was blessed to know as a child, the
Brothers subsidized their schools through the manufacture and sale of wine and
spirits.
21 See Valerie Strauss, $26,000 Cost Pushes Up Barriers to Area Private Schools,
WASH. POST, Apr. 3, 2006, at A1 (describing how rising tuition costs are putting
private schools out of reach for poor and middle-class children).

MACRO_FL_BRENNAN

108

11/7/2006 8:56:42 AM

JOURNAL OF CATHOLIC LEGAL STUDIES

[Vol. 45:1

an Institute can no longer do the work that is its to perform, who
in his right mind would feel a divine call to join in such work?
The shortage of Brothers and the Brothers’ inability to do their
work combine to cause each other. The result is that at a time
when America’s poor children are more desperate than ever for
worthy education, some of poor children’s most ardent advocates
in the United States are going the way of the Passenger Pigeon,
and, at least in part, for systemic reasons of which the Brothers
are innocent. Sadly but not inevitably, American social and legal
soil does not nourish the Lasallians’ particular munus, service of
the poor through education.
The interlocking luck of wealth, location, and property taxes
results, under our current education dispensation, in the
conscription of low-income children by local public schools. There
do remain the exceptional cases in which scholarships deliver
poor children to schools of their parents’ choosing, but the legallysanctioned situation renders poor and low-income parents unable
to make educational choices that rich people make every day.
Much of the “Catholic” literature on school choice takes the
family, or occasionally the “preferential option for the poor,” as a
starting point. The different, though largely complementary and
certainly broader, angle pursued here concerns not just the
family or distributive justice, but the freedom of expansion of
group persons, including the Institute of the Brothers of the
Christian Schools and their particular schools. Thought and
practice that fail to respect the plural munera of distinct societies
lead inexorably to the atomized world in which individuals, and
poor people especially, face the monolithic state one by one.
If, instead, we respect these societies for what they are and
can be, then the question we must go on to ask is how to support
and coordinate the plural munera of plural societies. The
pluralist must face the issues the totalizer would bowdlerize.
Although direct aid to religious societies, such as the Brothers or
their schools, is out of the question in the U.S. today, aid to
families, who can then enlist the services of religious societies, is,
to the extent the rule of Zelman v. Simmons-Harris 22 holds, a
possibility. Zelman is a development and application of the
principle of Pierce v. Society of Sisters, 23 according to which

22
23

536 U.S. 639, 652 (2002).
268 U.S. 510 (1925).
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principle the state may not “unreasonably interfer[e] with the
liberty of parents and guardians to direct the upbringing and
education of children under their control.” 24
This paper comprises five parts.
Part I develops the
particular munus that is the Brothers’. Some readers may prefer
to skip ahead to Part II and come at once to my argument about
munera, societies, and subsidiarity in general. An intellectual
advantage to a prior immersion in the Brothers’ munus is that it
brings into relief a fact frequently elided in our American
discourse: the individual-versus-the-state model, to which we are
becoming inured, damages not just the family, but also other
institutions vital to the good of civil society and, yes, the Church
in all her members. Part of the legitimate state’s responsibility
is to contribute to group-persons’ satisfaction of their respective
munera. These conditions are neglected at our common peril,
though—and this is the crux of the matter—frequently without
many people’s quite noticing. As Professor Joseph Viteritti has
observed,
If there is any danger inherent in the relationship between
religious institutions and government that pertains in the
United States, it has little to do with the eventuality of an
established church. Our great risk arises from the fact that
because so few Americans live their lives according to the strict
dictates of their faith, the majority of us do not appreciate the
strength of the moral obligations that compel devout observers.
We need to be reminded that such people exist, and that it was
for their sake that the First Amendment was written. We
should not expect them to accept the secularist ethos that most
Americans are comfortable with, or to do deal with their faith
on the same terms that the rest of us do. 25

“Such people” include the Lasallians with devout desire to
the work of the Church for the poor. Who can justify the
systemic frustration of the Lasallians’ zeal to do their corporate
religious work for the good of the Church and God’s children,
especially the poor, for the good of families, and for the common
good? Neglect overtakes justification, and here we are: Group
persons are simply occluded, their munera ignored.

24 Id. at 534–35. The “principle” of Pierce was “reaffirm[ed]” in Griswold v.
Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479, 483 (1965). Also see Troxel v. Granville, 530 U.S. 57, 65
(2000).
25 VITERITTI, supra note 18, at 208.
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In Part II, I develop and analyze the concept of “society” or
‘group person,’ the social significance of societies’ respective
munera, and, finally, the content of subsidiarity in a world that
respects group persons and their respective munera. In sum, the
Catholic expectation is one of plural societies, with their
respective authorities, harmonized by appropriate subsidium.
Returning to schools and families, I summarize in Part III the
Catholic position with respect to locating and sharing
responsibility for education. It is the munus of the family to be
the primary provider of education of its children, though
frequently it will require help in meeting this mission. In Part
IV, I measure aspects of my thesis against recent work on school
choice and subsidiarity, arguing that Catholic social thought, as
developed earlier in the paper, allows us to “take Pierce
seriously,” but requires us also to reject an understanding of
subsidiarity that prefers in-principle “value pluralism” to respect
for the munera granted by creation and redemption. Admittedly,
there is an element of wheel-reinvention to all of this. Already in
his 1939 encyclical Divini Illius Magistri, Pope Pius XI (citing
and quoting the Pierce case!) said this:
It must be borne in mind also that the obligation of the family
to bring up children, includes not only religious and moral
education, but physical and civic education as well, principally
in so far as it touches upon religion and morality.
This incontestable right of the family has at various times been
recognized by nations anxious to respect the natural law in
their civil enactments. Thus, to give one recent example, the
Supreme Court of the United States of America, in a decision on
an important controversy, declared that it is not in the
competence of the State to fix any uniform standard of
education by forcing children to receive instruction exclusively
in public schools, and it bases its decision on the natural law:
the child is not the mere creature of the State; those who
nurture him and direct his destiny have the right coupled with
the high duty, to educate him and prepare him for the
fulfilment of his obligations. 26

I. THE LASALLIAN MUNUS AND MINISTRY
The characteristic Lasallian contribution is the one made in
26 PIUS XI, ENCYCLICAL LETTER DIVINI ILLIUS MAGISTRI ¶¶ 36–37 (1939)
[hereinafter DIVINI ILLIUS MAGISTRI ].
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the quiet obscurity of the classroom—but, as already indicated,
not just any classroom, for any old reason. The insight on the
basis of which the Lasallians above all can enrich today’s world is
the one Jacques Maritain attributed to St. La Salle in these
beautifully stark terms: “this priest of heroic self-devotion and
profound spirituality had the deep insight that the poor have a
right to education, which was synonymous for him—and remains
synonymous for his sons—with Christian education.” 27 Some
three centuries before both the United Nations’ 1959 Declaration
on the Rights of the Child and the Second Vatican Council’s echo
of that U.N. declaration in its own 1965 Declaration on Christian
Education (Gravissimum Educationis), John Baptist de La Salle
declared the right and sought, through the work of his Institute,
to satisfy it. This is the core of La Salle’s spiritual patrimony;
service to the poor through education is the Institute’s munus.
But what of the fact that today’s world differs in so many
respects from the world LaSalle faced? The world has changed;
how should the Brothers change? As Brother George Van
Grieken, F.S.C., observes in Touching the Hearts of Students:
Characteristics of Lasallian Schools: “To do justice to De La
Salle’s charism in the contemporary world, one must do justice
both to the nature of that charism and to the nature of the
contemporary world, placing them in critical dialogue with each
other.” 28 We can begin this dialogue by inquiring how those who
claim La Salle, whom Pope Pius XII in 1950 named “Patron of All
Teachers of Youth,” as their inspiration should shape themselves
and their work in this world of ours that is so different from any
that has been seen before. How ought the Brothers respond to
and work within a legal culture that denies the conditions
necessary to satisfaction of their munus? As Jacques Maritain
said to the Brothers in 1951, on the occasion of the tercentenary
celebration of La Salle’s birth, “genuine spiritual faithfulness is
free from merely material attachment to custom, even venerable,
and that in circumstances basically different the same spirit and
the same aims must be served by different methods of

27 Jacques Maritain, Manhattan College Address (Apr. 30, 1951), available at
http://www2.nd.edu/Departments//Maritain/jm315.htm (emphasis added) (original
emphasis omitted).
28 GEORGE
VAN GRIEKEN, TOUCHING THE HEARTS OF STUDENTS:
CHARACTERISTICS OF LASALLIAN SCHOOLS 121 (1999).
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application.” 29 If Maritain is right that no blind adherence to old
ways of doing things can go unchallenged, he is also right that
nothing short of genuine spiritual faithfulness will do. The
spiritual bequest of La Salle is a gift to the whole Church, but it
remains the special trust of the Brothers of the Christian
Schools, as Brother Luke Salm, F.S.C., acknowledges, while also
sounding a word of warning:
The spiritual vision of De La Salle could never have survived to
enrich future generations of Brothers, students and colleagues,
if the community had not achieved institutional form. Its
formally approved and clearly defined juridical character is a
necessary and important guarantee that the legacy of De La
Salle will have stability and permanence, that the spirituality
and the charism of the Founder can be kept alive, developed,
and transmitted from one generation to the next. Thus it is the
Institute itself that constitutes the total legacy of John Baptist
de La Salle. 30

The Brothers are fewer and fewer, but, as long as it lasts, the
Institute that comprises them retains its distinct munus in the
life of the Church and the world she serves, a function growing
out of La Salle’s unique charism and vision. The munus of the
Their
Lasallians cannot be altogether “outsourced.” 31
Maritain, supra note 27.
LUKE SALM, F.S.C., THE WORK IS YOURS: THE LIFE OF SAINT JOHN BAPTIST
DE LA SALLE 203 (2d ed. 1996).
31 Many Catholic orders are in decline, of course, but the Brothers, like so many
other lay congregations, have fared far worse than most of the venerable clerical
orders. Without Holy Orders and a sacramental ministry as ballast and direction,
the Brothers, especially in the U.S., have been hurtling toward dissolution. But will
the disappearance of the Brothers spell the end of the Lasallian story in the U.S.?
Perhaps, but not necessarily.
Today’s Brothers have resolved and undertaken to preserve the spiritual and
some of the institutional legacy of La Salle. They are attempting to do this by
entering into “partnership” with lay men and women in the work that was once the
Brothers’ alone. What used to be Brothers’ schools—schools staffed exclusively (or
predominantly) by Brothers and led by a Brother—are being succeeded by “Lasallian
schools”—schools staffed and led by dedicated lay people in cooperation with a
handful of Brothers whose new work it is to imbue their partners with the essentials
of Lasallian spirituality and pedagogy.
We can ask whether it would make sense to speak of Lasallian schools if no
Christian Brothers were anywhere to be found, but this is a question we need not
face, at least not yet. And though we can brood over the notorious impossibility and
collateral costs of “institutionalizing” charism, at the same time we should hope that
the special gift of St. La Salle to the Church and the world will not evaporate in
proportion to the number of Brothers who continue to live by the Saint’s Rule. We
cannot predict the results of the Brothers’ and their Partners’ current efforts, but, in
29
30
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characteristic function is—or should be—what is supported and
sought, as it is irreducibly theirs.
This point made by Brothers, and made to the Brothers by
Maritain, is made more generally by the Church, and in
particular in the authoritative teaching of the Second Vatican
Council in its norms for the renewal of the religious life. There
has been a tendency on the part of some since Vatican II to
“explor[e] now this and now that new possibility.” 32 What the
Church asks of religious societies or institutes is fidelity to their
proper munera:
It is for the good of the Church that institutes have their own
proper character and functions [munera]. Therefore the spirit
and aims of each founder should be faithfully accepted and
retained, as indeed should each institute’s sound traditions, for
all of these constitute the patrimony of an institute. . . . All
institutes should share in the life of the Church. They should
make their own and should foster to the best of their ability, in
a manner consonant with their own natures, its initiatives and
undertakings . . . . 33

As today the Brothers renew their Institute and its work
through re-appropriation of the spirit and aims of St. La Salle,
trying (what Maritain referred to as) “different methods of
application,” 34 the Church bids them preserve their munus of
serving the poor through education. This is the task that is
properly their own, from their Founder and from the universal
Church. Vatican II adds that, in reforming their approach to
their respective munera, the active orders and institutes must
continue to be missionary in vision and aims:
Institutes should faithfully maintain and accomplish the tasks
that are theirs . . . . The missionary spirit must, absolutely, be
aid of them, we can join with the Lasallians in discerning the place of, and making
way for, the Lasallian schools of the future. As the Lasallians plumb St. La Salle’s
spiritual patrimony for what it can speak to us today, we can assist by meeting them
in dialogue about this world of ours that needs the Lasallian contribution. Cf. VAN
GRIEKEN, supra note 28, at 13–21.
32 BERNARD LONERGAN, Dimensions of Meaning, in 4 COLLECTION: COLLECTED
WORKS OF BERNARD LONERGAN 245 (Frederick E. Crowe & Robert M. Doran eds.,
1988).
33 VATICAN II, DECREE ON THE UP-TO-DATE RENEWAL OF RELIGIOUS LIFE:
PERFECTAE CARITATIS ¶ 2 (Oct. 28, 1965), reprinted in VATICAN COUNCIL II: THE
CONCILIAR AND POST CONCILIAR DOCUMENTS 611, 612 (Austin Flannery ed., 1998)
(1975) [hereinafter PERFECTAE CARITATIS].
34 Maritain, supra note 27.
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preserved in religious institutes and must be adapted to modern
conditions, in keeping with the character of each, so that the
preaching of the Gospel to all nations may be more effective. 35

This is the renewal—the “genuine spiritual faithfulness”—to
which the Church calls that part of herself that is the Institute of
the Brothers of Christian Schools.
Genuine spiritual faithfulness will require, furthermore,
fidelity to LaSalle’s particular conception of the purpose of
education. For Lasallians the quotidian deeds of education have
the eternal salvation of the pupils as their final cause.
God wills not only that all come to the knowledge of the truth
but also that all be saved . . . . He cannot truly desire this end
without providing the means for it and, therefore, without
giving children teachers who will assist them in the fulfillment
of this plan. . . .
Therefore, you must honor your ministry and keep trying to
save some of these children. 36

The quoted language comes from La Salle’s Meditations for
the Time of Retreat, and the scriptural text on which he is
meditating is, of course, I Timothy 2:4: “God desires that all men
be saved and to come to knowledge of the truth.” 37 Hans Urs von
Balthasar and others have wondered whether we can dare hope
that all humans be saved. 38 John Baptist de la Salle made God’s
expressed desire that all his children be saved and come to
knowledge of the truth a principle of action, the precept of a new
ministry.
Some today warm to Lasallians for their historical
commitment to serve the poor, and would edit out those elements
of the Saint’s work that concern salvation and coming to
knowledge of the truth. Much of the crusade to relativize
“Christian education” cathects the moral need to respect the
individual conscience. Such unbalanced focus on “the right to
liberty of conscience” can obscure the fact that the authentic
right springs, as the Second Vatican Council taught in the
Declaration on Religious Liberty (Dignitatis Humanae) from the
universal human duty “to seek the truth, especially religious
PERFECTAE CARITATIS, supra note 33, ¶ 20.
JOHN BAPTIST DE LA SALLE: THE SPIRITUALITY OF CHRISTIAN EDUCATION 39
(Carl Koch et al. eds., 2004) [hereinafter KOCH].
37 I Timothy 2:4.
38 See generally HANS URS VON BALTHASAR, DARE WE HOPE “THAT ALL MEN BE
SAVED?”, (David Kipp & Lothar Krauth eds., 1988).
35
36
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truth,” and that, furthermore, “[all people] are also bound to
adhere to the truth once they come to know it and direct their
whole lives in accordance with the demands of truth.” 39 No one
today can say in the name of the Church that anyone should be
forced to embrace the Catholic faith in violation of his own
conscience. Correlatively, Catholics must affirm that no effort
can be spared in helping people freely to inform their conscience
according to that truth in which salvation lies. The work
initiated by La Salle simply loses its raison d’etre if the exigence
to bring children to salvation and knowledge of the truth is
overlooked or, God forbid, denied.
La Salle conceived of this work of the Brothers—bringing
children to salvation and knowledge of the truth--as exactly what
he called it: ministry. Though himself a priest, La Salle founded
a lay movement. Like members of most other modern orders and
institutes, the Brothers take vows of poverty, chastity, and
obedience, but they are not called to Holy Orders. All members
of La Salle’s Institute pursue a properly lay ministry, rather than
a sacramental ministry. In the words of one contemporary
scholar, Brother Michael McGinnis, F.S.C.:
“[La Salle’s] determined insistence on the lay character of the
society did not emerge from an a priori position about the
relationships of clergy and laity (such a one could develop in
contemporary theology and practice) but rather from pursuing
particular commitments to which the events of his life had
directed him.” 40

Those commitments included serving the neglected poor through
education. Education, as conceived of by the Saint, however, was
not the classical education of—say—the Ratio Studiorum, nor
was it, as we post-moderns might imagine, about getting
“information” across to incipient utility-maximizers. La Salle
was conspicuously concerned about developing practical skills in
the Brothers’ disciples (as the Saint liked to refer to their pupils),
about teaching those disciples manners and modes of conduct
and deportment in a way that would call their own human
dignity to their attention, and about their disciples’ learning
39 See generally VATICAN II, DECLARATION ON RELIGIOUS LIBERTY: DIGNITATIS
HUMANAE ¶ 2 (Dec. 7, 1965), reprinted in VATICAN COUNCIL II, supra note 33, at
799–800 [hereinafter DIGNITATIS HUMANAE ].
40
KOCH, supra note 36, at 248 n.34 (quoting MICHAEL MCGINNIS, F.S.C.,
Church, in LASALLIAN THEMES 83, 90 (1992)).
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what they needed to know to get along well in the world. To the
mind of La Salle, however, the Brothers’ work was emphatically
not social work but ministry. La Salle and his Brothers rose
early and labored late from a devout desire to see that as many
as possible might be saved and come to knowledge of the truth.
The following are the terms in which La Salle understood the
Brothers’ work in the Church:
[Y]ou must honor your ministry and keep trying to save some of
these children. (Rom. 11:13-14). Because God has made you his
ministers to reconcile them to him, according to the expression
of the same apostle, and has entrusted you for this purpose with
the word of reconciliation for them, exhort them as if God were
urging them through you, for you have been destined to
cultivate these young plants (Ps 128:3, 144:12) by announcing
the truths of the gospel to them (2 Cor 5:18-20) and to procure
for them the means of salvation appropriate to their
development. 41
God has had the goodness to remedy [the misfortune of
children in abject poverty and neglect] by the establishment of
the Christian Schools, where the teaching is offered free of
charge and entirely for the glory of God, where the children are
kept all day to learn reading, writing, and their religion, and
where they are always busy, so that when their parents want
them to go to work, they are ready for employment. 42

La Salle clarified and assured the dignity of the work of
serving the poor through education and thereby contributed to
their salvation, because he never confused or conflated
sacramental ministry and the ministry to be performed by his
Brothers.
The writings in which La Salle refers to this saving work of
the Brothers as “ministry” were considered spirituality and not
theology, and therefore they were not scrutinized for their
orthodoxy in connection with his canonization in 1900. 43 But it
would be a mistake to elide the Saint’s teaching about ministry,
even if out of a healthy fear of avoiding the wrong side of today’s
debates about what is and what is not “ministry” in the Church. 44
See KOCH, supra note 36, at 39.
See id. at 40.
43 See id. at 27 (citing MCGINNIS, supra note 40, at 89).
44 See, e.g., UNITED STATES CONFERENCE OF CATHOLIC BISHOPS, CO-WORKERS
IN THE VINEYARD OF THE LORD 5 (2005) (offering a “pastoral and theological
41
42
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What stands out for our contemporary edification is La Salle’s
insight that the work of basic education—not just the critical task
of catechesis—is part of the ministerial work of the whole Church,
pursued especially on behalf of the poor by the Institute he
founded for that purpose. “How you ought to consider yourselves
honored,” said La Salle to his Brothers, “by the Church, to be
called by her to a work so holy and so lofty and for which she has
chosen you to procure for children a knowledge of our religion
and of the spirit of Christianity.” 45 Though La Salle was
ingenuous and firm in his insistence that the Brothers be loyal in
their submission to the pastors of the Church 46 , and thus in his
insistence that the Brothers be lay ministers of the Church, it is
also clear that, as Brother Michael McGinnis explains, for La
Salle
The ministry which the Brothers exercise on behalf of poor
children is actually a participation in the saving work of God,
whose will to save all humankind became incarnated in the life
and ministry of Jesus. Just as Jesus revealed the way the way
to God, so too the Brothers reveal the way to union with God
through the instruction of their students, as ‘ministers of God
and dispensers of his mysteries’. This participation in the
saving work of God and Christ is accomplished in and through
the education, both expressly religious and secular, of the
children, not in some separate religious dimension of life. 47

When the Lasallians are striving to satisfy the rights of the
child, including the poor child, to education, they are doing the
work of the Church. This is the spiritual heritage that comes
down to us in the Church from St. La Salle, who instructed his
Brothers: “Jesus Christ has sent you and . . . the church, whose
ministers you are, employs you.” 48 When the Lasallians cannot
pursue their ministry or munus, it is Jesus Christ’s will that is
frustrated—or so the Saint taught.
For Christians, there is no higher calling, no greater
sending, than to do the missionary work Christ entrusted to his
disciples. The untraditional initiative La Salle launched in 1680
reflection on the reality of lay ecclesial ministry . . . as a synthesis of best thinking
and practice”)
45 See KOCH, supra note 36, at 54.
46 See MCGINNIS, supra note 40, at 85 (discussing La Salle’s meditation for the
Chair of Peter, On the Submission We Owe the Church).
47 See id. at 89.
48 See KOCH, supra note 36, at 55.
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in the face of the abject neglect of poor children did not receive
papal or state approval until 1725, four years after the Saint’s
death. Furthermore, until the codification of 1917 his Institute
was not incorporated into Canon Law. 49 Respectful though he
was of the institutional Church and her right to govern, La Salle
went to work for the poor—by organizing communities of
Brothers and “the Christian Schools” without awaiting
permission. 50 Against Gallican bishops who opposed the reforms
of the Council of Trent, La Salle stood with the Church. 51 Within
a Church that under the mandate of Trent was to raise the level
of education of her seminarians and priests, La Salle sought to
raise the level of education of even the poorest. Against the
background of Gallican political claims over the life of the
Church, La Salle formed a society of the Church without
awaiting royal initiative or even permission. 52 La Salle would
not have denied the right of royal or ecclesiastical authorities to
regulate the activities of his society inasmuch as they might
claim a share in authority touching the common good. The
thought that would not have occurred to La Salle is this, that the
work of educating the poor was essentially the government’s and,
therefore, its own to monopolize or neglect at will. This thought
that wouldn’t have occurred to La Salle dominates our thinking
and deciding, leading inter alia to a systemic stifling of the
conditions necessary to the success of the Lasallian initiative.
II. SOCIETIES, MUNERA, AND SUBSIDIARITY
I turn now to sketch the principles of Catholic social thought
that call for the creation of legal and cultural conditions different
from those that obtain in the United States today.
The
coordinate starting points of the Catholic position are that, first,
society is an intrinsic perfection of the human person, and,
second, genuine human societies have munera given by divine,
natural, or positive (including ecclesiastical) law. On this
analysis, furthermore, subsidiarity is a principle, not of
devolution, but, first, of recognition of the respective social
functions of given societies, and, second, of respect for and
coordination of those societies and their munera and, as
49
50
51
52

See id. at 33.
See id. at 25–27, 33.
See id. at 34.
See id. at 8–20, 33. See generally SALM, supra note 30, passim.
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necessary, of the provision of help to them, but only for their own
immediate good and, mediately, for the common good. The
Catechism of the Catholic Church, recapitulating the
developments in magisterial teaching over the last century,
traces munera and the complementary principle of subsidiarity to
the human person’s participation in the divine rule:
God has not willed to reserve to himself all exercise of power.
He entrusts to every creature the functions [munera] it is
capable of performing, according to the capacities of its own
nature. This mode of governance ought to be followed in social
life. The way God acts in governing the world, which bears
witness to such great regard for human freedom, should inspire
the wisdom of those who govern communities. They behave as
ministers of divine providence. 53
The teaching of the Church has elaborated the principle of
subsidiarity, according to which a “community of a higher order
should not interfere in the internal life of a community of lower
order, depriving the latter of its functions [munera], but rather
should support it in case of need and help to coordinate its
activity with the activities of the rest of society, always with a
view to the common good.” 54

On this Catholic view, in ruling himself individually through
self-mastery, or, as concerns us here, at the level of society,
through authority over a particular community, the human
person is participating in the order of divine providential rule. 55
The principle of subsidiarity respects the plurality of such
authorities, and determines the conditions under which they are
entitled to receive aid or may be subject to regulation. Professor
Hittinger explains,
The Catholic position holds that the political sovereign is
limited by the very existence of real group persons. A normal
society, then, is not so much an expansion of the private so
much as a multiplication of authorities embedded in group
persons. On this view, subsidiarity is not devolution—rather, it
is a principle governing the harmony and coordination of group

53 CATECHISM OF THE CATHOLIC CHURCH ¶ 1884 (2d ed. 1997) [hereinafter
CATECHISM].
54 Id. ¶ 1883 (quotations omitted).
55 Patrick McKinley Brennan, The Decreasing Ontological Density of the State in
Catholic Social Doctrine, __ VILL. L. REV. __ (forthcoming 2007).
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persons. 56

What I have just summarized, I shall now unpack.
From the perspective of Catholic social thought, a leading
error in modern moral and political philosophy—an error which
leads to many other errors, to which Church teaching also
responds—concerns man’s nature as intrinsically social. The
trend in modern thought is to say that the person can be, if he
choose, supplemented—so to speak—by society. From John
Locke (and others) our culture inherits the idea that each of us is
to be about his or her own privatized mission. Although Locke
had God assigning people their individual missions, what has
endured of Locke’s doctrine is the idea that each of us is
essentially autonomous, that is, on an individual mission (from
God?). 57 The Church, however, continues to teach that society is
an intrinsic perfection of the human person. In the words of the
Catechism: “The human person needs to live in society. Society
is not for him an extraneous addition but a requirement of his
nature.” 58 The Compendium of the Social Doctrine of the Church
elaborates:
Made in the image and likeness of God (cf. Gen. 1:26), and made
visible in the universe in order to live in society (cf. Gen. 2:20,
23) and exercise dominion over the earth (cf. Gen 1:26, 28-30),
the human person is for this reason called from the very
beginning to life in society: “God did not create man as a
‘solitary being’ but wished him to be a ‘social being’. Social life
therefore is not exterior to man: he can only grow and realize
his vocation in relation with others.” 59

This passage is typical of the Catholic social thought of the
last hundred years as it links man’s essentially social perfection
to God’s plan for human participation in the divine rule. Man
shares in the ruling power of God by being able to order things
for himself and his fellows, but he does this through what Pope
John Paul II referred to in Veritatis Splendor as a “participated

56 Russell Hittinger, Society, Subsidiarity, and Authority in Catholic Social
Thought, in AFTER AUTHORITY (Patrick McKinley Brennan ed.) (forthcoming 2007)
[hereinafter Hittinger, Society].
57 See
MICHAEL J. WHITE, POLITICAL PHILOSOPHY: AN HISTORICAL
INTRODUCTION 147–48 (2003).
58 CATECHISM, supra note 53, ¶ 1879.
59 PONTIFICAL COUNCIL FOR JUSTICE AND PEACE, COMPENDIUM OF THE SOCIAL
DOCTRINE OF THE CHURCH ¶ 149 (2004) [hereinafter COMPENDIUM].
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theonomy.” 60 Though free, and both capable of and charged with
self-rule, human persons are always under law 61 —a point to
which we shall return below.
Intrinsically importunate of society, the human person works
out his earthly life in all manner of associations and partnerships
with other persons. As I shall use it, ”society” is a technical term
for a particular form of social unity: human unity that is not a
merely instrumental (as, for instance, partnerships usually
are), 62 but also an intransitive human good or perfection. We
moderns gravitate toward the common usage according to which
“society” is just an aggregate total of individuals; we have grown
used to the modern idea that only individual men and women
exist. But, according to the Catholic mind as expressed in the
Catechism,
A society is a group of persons bound together organically by a
principle of unity that goes beyond each one of them. As an
assembly that is at once visible and spiritual, a society endures
through time: it gathers up the past and prepares for the future.
By means of society, each man is established as an ‘heir’ and
receives certain ‘talents’ that enrich his identity and whose
fruits he must develop.
He rightly owes loyalty to the
communities of which he is part and respect to those in
authority who have charge of the common good. 63

The Church understands herself to be a society, one formed
by God, rather than by mere sociological adherence. 64 The
JOHN PAUL II, ENCYCLICAL LETTER VERITATIS SPLENDOR ¶ 41.2 (1993).
Russell Hittinger draws the implications of this participated theonomy, in the
context of commenting on Aquinas’s doctrine of natural law as a participation in the
eternal law:
By the impression of created light God induces the creature to share in the
rules and first measures of the eternal law. The radical implications of
Thomas’s teaching should be evident. Every created intelligence not only
has a competence to make judgments, but to make judgments according to
a real law—indeed, a law that is the form and pattern of all other laws.
Thus, the legal order of things does not begin with an acquired virtue,
possessed by a few; nor does it begin with the offices and statutes of human
positive law; nor does it begin with the law revealed at Sinai. God speaks
the law, at least in its rudiments, to every intelligent creature.
RUSSELL HITTINGER, THE FIRST GRACE 98 (2003).
62 See Hittinger, Society, supra note 56.
63 CATECHISM, supra note 53, ¶ 1880.
64 See VATICAN II, DOGMATIC CONSTITUTION ON THE CHURCH: LUMEN GENTIUM
¶ 4 (Nov. 21, 1964), reprinted in THE BASIC SIXTEEN DOCUMENTS OF VATICAN
COUNCIL II, at 1, 3 (Austin Flannery ed., 1996) (1964) [hereinafter LUMEN GENTIUM]
(“Hence the universal church is seen to be ‘a people made one by the unity of the
60
61
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Institute of the Brothers of the Christian Schools—like the
Society of Jesus that preceded it in time—is another society,
formed within and ordained by the Church, and thus possessed of
a right to exist (unless and until suppressed by the Church
because of its failure to achieve its munus). The family is still
another society, formed by a man and a woman, and first
ordained by God. This society also has a right to exist and to be
recognized. 65 Schools, too, can be societies in their own right, for
they are—or can be—“group[s] of persons bound together
organically by a principle of unity that goes beyond each one of
them,” 66 gathering up the past, preparing for the future, and
enriching the identity and fruits of those who are loyal to it.
Such societies will be subject to appropriate regulation by the
state, in furtherance of the common good, but their right to exist
and function is not conferred by the state.
Before pursuing the last point, it will be helpful to develop a
little more fully the concept of a society. Thomas Aquinas affirms
that there are wholes—that is, there are true unities—that are
not the unity of an individual substantial kind; these are “unities
of order”:
It must be known that the whole which the political group or
the family constitutes has only a unity of order, for it is not
something absolutely one. A part of this whole, therefore, can
have an operation that is not the operation of the whole, as a
soldier in an army has an activity that does not belong to the
whole. However, this whole does have an operation that is not
proper to its parts but to the whole. 67

As Johannes Messner explains, “The unity of society is
neither a mere aggregation of self-sufficient individuals nor a
‘formation’ organized for an external purpose. It is,” Messner
Father, the Son and the holy Spirit.’ ”). See generally AVERY DULLES, MODELS OF
RATZINGER, CALLED TO COMMUNION: UNDERSTANDING

THE CHURCH (2002); JOSEPH
THE CHURCH TODAY (1996).

See infra pp. 130–44.
CATECHISM, supra note 53, ¶ 1880.
67 ST. THOMAS AQUINAS, IN DECEM LIBROS ETHICORUM ARISTOTELIS AD
NICHOMACHUM EXPOSITIO, lib. I, lec. 1, no. 5 (Marietti 1949) (“Sciendum est autem,
quod hoc totum, quod est civilis multitude, vel domestica familia, habet solam
unitatem ordinis, secundum quam non est aliquid simpliciter unum. Et ideo pars
eius totius, potest habere operationem, quae non est operatio totius, sicut miles in
exercitu habet operationen quae non est totius exercitus. Habet nihilominus et
ipsum totum aliquam operationem, quae non est propria alicuis partium, sed totius,
puta conflictus totius exercitus”).
65
66
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continues, “a unity of order, that is, a unity in virtue of an
immanent end coordinating the conduct of its members by means
of their self-determination. Order signifies unity due to an inner
principle of form.” 68 Furthermore, according to St. Thomas, the
unity of order that constitutes a society is deserving of, as
Maitland would later agree, the predicate “person.” The reason
for this predication, which refers to something that is unique by
reason of its dignity, 69 emerges from Professor Hittinger’s
explication of what it is to enjoy a unity of order:
Things enjoying a unity of order each possess what is
individually proper to themselves—certain operations and acts
not reducible to the commonality, but which flow, rather, from a
natural or spontaneous unity of their nature—in a human
person, sensing, thinking, judging, willing, and so forth. These
natural properties are not dissolved or cancelled by membership
in a group. At the same time, a society enjoys a real unity
transcending mere aggregation of the members. Wherever
there are plural rational agents, aiming at common ends,
through united action, and where the unity is one of the
intrinsic goods aimed at, we have a society—something distinct
in dignity. To be sure, it is real—the crew team, the college, the
city, the marriage. But it is neither a substance nor a mere
imputation. A society will hold itself out to the rest of the world
as something distinct in dignity, possessing certain rights and
responsibilities. 70

This is not just an additive cumulation of individuals, but
unity distinct by reason of its dignity—a group person. 71
The metaphysics on which all this depends, as more than a
mere imputation, is not commonly embraced today, but it would
be a disservice to imagine that it has been limited to the Catholic
tradition. Re-enter Maitland:
When . . . a body of twenty, or two thousand, or two hundred
68 JOHANNES MESSNER, SOCIAL ETHICS: NATURAL LAW IN THE WESTERN WORLD
117–18 (J.J. Doherty trans., 3d ed. 1965).
69 See Hittinger, Society, supra note 56, at __ (discussing ST. THOMAS AQUINAS,
SUMMA THEOLOGIAE, pt. I, Q. 29, art. 3, at 31 (forthcoming) [hereinafter SUMMA
THEOLOGIAE]).
70 Hittinger, Society, supra note 56, at 2. Not every thing that enjoys a “unity of
order” is a society of which “person” can be predicated. See id. (quoting SUMMA
THEOLOGIAE, supra note 69, Q. 47, art. 3, at 261–62).
71 See, e.g., MESSNER, supra note 68, at 127–29 (discussing man as both
individual and social with respect to the function and goal of society in service to the
common good).
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thousand men bind themselves together to act in a particular
way for some common purpose, they create a body, which by no
fiction of law, but by the very nature of things, differs from the
individuals of whom it is constituted. . . .
...
. . . If the law allows men to form permanently organized
groups, those groups will be for common opinion right-and-dutybearing units; and if the law-giver will not openly treat them as
such, he will misrepresent, or as the French say, he will
‘denature’ the facts . . . . For the morality of common sense the
group is person, is right-and-duty- bearing unit. 72

To acknowledge the additive total of the individuals but deny
the existence of the unity of order that is a group person would be
to deny the society. Again Maitland:
Let the moral philosopher explain this, let him explain it as
illusion, let him explain it away; but he ought not to leave it
unexplained, nor, I think, will he be able to say that it is an
illusion which is losing power, for, on the contrary, it seems to
me to be persistently and progressively triumphing over certain
philosophical and theological prejudices. 73

One response to some people’s affirmation of society as a true
unity of order—a group person—is to deny it, as Margaret
Thatcher did. 74 Another is to follow a variation on one of the
courses adumbrated by Maitland: The state can claim exclusive
power over whether a society can be created and, if created
without concession of the state, whether it is to be granted
recognition by the state. The latter course is where the action
has unfolded in the modern period. With the (gaping) exception
of the unborn, the modern state has not denied the right of
individuals to exist. It has been the modern trend, however, for
the state to deny that societies have a right to exist (unless and
until the state grant such a revocable right). Take an example
adduced by Maitland: “It issues in the famous declaration of
August 18, 1792: ‘A State that is truly free ought not to suffer
within its bosom any corporation, not even such as, being
dedicated to public instruction, have merited well of the
72 MAITLAND, supra note 3, at 63, 68 (quotations omitted); see also Hittinger,
Society, supra note 56, at 2.
73 MAITLAND, supra note 3, at 68. On the history of theorizing about “group
personality” in modern political thought, see DAVID RUNCIMAN, PLURALISM AND THE
PERSONALITY OF THE STATE (1997).
74 See Hittinger, Society, supra note 56, at 1.
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country.’ ” 75
Take another example from France, this one
adduced by Hittinger. The Third French Republic claimed a
comprehensive right over societies, in this case religious
societies, when in 1901 it declared by legislation: “No religious
congregation may be formed without an authorization given by
law that determines the conditions of its exercise . . . . The
dissolution of a congregation or the closing of any establishment
may be declared by a cabinet decree.” 76 As it happens, Rousseau
had already gone several steps further when he insisted: It is
“important that there should be no partial society in the state.” 77
It has just this sort of totalizing claim that the Church has been
sure to counter, reminding the world that societies both exist
and, sometimes, exist by right that precedes the state and its
law.
Which brings us back to the question of munus. Just as,
according to the philosophia perennis, part of what constitutes a
substantial person is his possession of a function, so too,
according to Catholic social thought, part of what makes a society
what it is, is its possession of a munus. Professor Hittinger has
traced the consolidation of the Church’s teaching on munera, and
it would be otiose to repeat that history. 78 The substantive claim
of import here is that part of what it is to be a society is to have a
munus, which is a determinate share in ruling power. Munera
are determined sometimes primarily by divine law, as in the case
of the Church and the family; sometimes primarily by
ecclesiastical law, as in the case of the Christian Brothers;
sometimes primarily by civil law, as in the case of, say,
corporations.
I say “primarily,” because in most of the
aforementioned cases there may be multiple determinations. For
example, marriage is a society ordained by both natural law and
divine positive law; the state is ordained by nature but
determined by human positive law.
If we are not totally unaccustomed to the idea that certain
societies have their particular rights, it was the contribution of
Pius XI, according to Professor Hittinger, “to make clear that
[such] rights are not derived from human nature abstractly
MAITLAND, supra note 3, at 66.
Hittinger, Society, supra note 56, at 7 n.24.
77 JEAN-JACQUES ROUSSEAU, ON THE SOCIAL CONTRACT 32 (Donald A. Cress,
trans., 1983).
78 Hittinger, Social Pluralism, supra note 8.
75
76
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considered, but rather from human nature as already bearing
Before we can
(implicitly or explicitly) social munera.” 79
understand the rights and immunities, we must know what they
protect; before we can do justice in society, we need to know
where the munera have already been assigned. Thus, as
Hittinger explains,
[W]hen the political authority recognizes and helps to
coordinate the social roles and vocations, it is not in the first
place a question of distributive justice; for the magistrate does
not distribute the munera which have been assigned by creation
and redemption; rather, by recognizing these munera (including
the function of the state itself), the magistrate is recognizing a
legal justice that neither begins nor terminates in the state. 80

With respect to the munera that are distributed by creation
and redemption, their bearers are already existentially poised to
give the gift of the office, and when the state comes to consider
questions of social justice, it confronts a world in which certain
munera are already in operation and contributing to the common
good. 81 Munera that are distributed solely by positive law
dispose individuals and societies to action through their
reception, but the magistrate distributing such munera (e.g., the
judicial office) does so against the background of a world in which
human individuals and societies are already, through their
respective munera, participating in the divine rule.
The point is that the state and its magistrate never did
possess plenary ruling power in the first place—though this is
exactly what subsidiarity, as commonly discussed, presupposes,
to wit, that power should devolve from the top to the smallest
unit that can get the job done effectively. Within a world packed
with munera already in action or poised to act, subsidiarity is the
principle that (1) munera conferred by creation and redemption
are to be respected and (2) positive law is to be used to facilitate
and harmonize the aforementioned munera and to confer only
those additional munera that are either consistent with or of
assistance to those that precede positive law. As Hittinger

Id. at 58.
Id. at 58–59.
81 For an analysis of the relationship between ecclesial munera and the
conditions of their exercise, see LUMEN GENTIUM, supra note 64, in SACROSANCTUM
OECUMENICUM VATICANUM II, CONSTITUTIONES, DECRETA, DECLARATIONES 215–19
(1993); see also Hittinger, Social Pluralism, supra note 8, at 59–60.
79
80
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explains,
[S]ubsidiarity cannot create a social ontology, and it would be
useless or even destructive to make subsidiarity do that kind of
work. Any application of the principle of subsidiarity ahead of
the distribution of offices and powers is to put the cart before
the horse. For the question of just relations between social
offices and institutions presupposes the existence of these social
forms, each having its own esse proprium. And where the
nature and scope of these social forms is in doubt, subsidiarity
remains a principle without matter. 82

Every society possessed of its own proper being is, if it is
functioning as it ought, a locus of genuine authority. It is not by
concession of the state that plural authorities exist; plural
authorities are the natural state of affairs, which totalizing
governments denature and destroy.
Again, this natural
pluralism is not a lawless state: every genuine society is such
because it possesses a munus, and this is a participation in the
divine governance. Properly functioning families, churches, and
schools are participants in the divine rule. Every society is thus
under law; its genuine authority is a function of its possession of
genuine, lawful ruling power. It falls to the state, then, as the
instrument of civil society, to coordinate the interaction of plural
societies, with their respective munera, for the common good.
What Pope Leo XIII said regarding the state and workers’ rights
to band together in associations also applies mutatis mutandis to
the state’s relationship to the plurality of genuine societies:
Private societies, then, although they exist within the body
politic, and are severally part of the commonwealth, cannot
nevertheless be absolutely, and as such, prohibited by public
authority. For, to enter into a “society” of this kind is the
natural right of man; and the [civitas] has for its office to
protect natural rights, not to destroy them. . . .
...
. . . The State should watch over these societies of citizens
banded together in accordance with their rights, but it should
not thrust itself into their peculiar concerns and their
organization, for things move and live by the spirit inspiring
them, and may be killed by the rough grasp of a hand from
without. 83

82
83

Hittinger, Social Pluralism, supra note 8, at 60–61.
LEO XIII, ENCYCLICAL LETTER RERUM NOVARUM ¶¶ 51, 55 (1891).
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I have lingered over the right of non-state-created societies
to exist and be recognized because, unless and until we are
poised to assert this right, too often, as history reveals, the state
will find it expedient to ignore or deny the right. Frequently,
however, it is not enough for the state merely to recognize the
societies that it does not create; sometimes such societies need
help. To “watch over,” 84 as Leo says, will sometimes mean to
assist. In the root sense of subsidium, subsidiarity refers to help
or aid, as in the English ”subsidy.” But this is not all there is
to—indeed, this is not the core of—subsidiarity as understood in
Catholic social thought, Hittinger explains, developing the
historical work of the nineteenth century Jesuit Luigi Taparelli
that influenced Popes:
[S]ubsidiarity evokes the concept of auxiliary troops in the
Roman legion which sat below’ [sub sedeo], ready and dutybound to render service. Hence, it describes the right. . . of
social groups, each enjoying its own proper mode of action.
While sometimes identified with the word subsidium (help,
assistance), the point of subsidiarity is a normative structure of
plural social forms, not a trickling down of power or aid. . . .
[S]ocial justice is that kind of order that ensues when each
person is capacitated to ‘exercise his social munus,” to
contribute to the common good according to his proper office and
role. This may or may not require the giving of aid, the
correction of a deficiency, or the removal of barriers to the
performance of social duties, but what it always entails is
respect for a pluriform social order. 85

Johannes Messner brings into focus the true nature of
subsidiarity by avoiding the common expression “the principle of
subsidiarity,” preferring instead the locution “the principle of
subsidiary function.” 86 Subsidiarity and function/munus travel

Id. ¶ 55.
Russell Hittinger, Introduction to Modern Catholicism, in I THE TEACHINGS
OF MODERN CHRISTIANITY ON LAW, POLITICS, AND HUMAN NATURE 3, 23 (John Witte
Jr. & Frank Alexander eds., 2006) (quoting PIUS XI, ENCYCLICAL LETTER DIVINI
REDEMPTORIS ¶ 32 (1937) [hereinafter DIVINI REDEMPTORIS] ); see also Thomas C.
Behr, Luigi Taparelli D’Azeglio, S.J. (1793–1862) and the Development of Scholastic
Natural-Law Thought as a Science of Society and Politics, 6 J. MKTS. & MORALITY
99, 105 (2003); THOMAS BEHR, LUIGI TAPARELLI AND THE 19TH CENTURY NEOTHOMISTIC “REVOLUTION” IN NATURAL LAW AND CATHOLIC SOCIAL SCIENCES 22–38
(2000) (Ph.D dissertation, State University of New York at Buffalo); MESSNER, supra
note 68, at 212.
86 MESSNER, supra note 68, at 212.
84
85
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together. “[S]ubsidiarity . . . is a principle derivative from social
justice: namely, that when subsidium be given either by the
parts to the whole or the whole to the parts the plurality of
functions or munera should not be destroyed or absorbed.” 87 The
governmental instrument that we refer to as the state exists to
serve the plural societies that co-exist with and within it, with a
view toward the common good. According to Pope Pius XI, in
Divini Redemptoris, “the genuine and chief [munus] of public and
civil authority consists precisely in the efficacious furthering of
this harmony and coordination of all social forces,” 88 which, as
the Pope observes, includes genuine societies. The goal is to
“fuse[] [them] into a harmonious unity inspired by the principle
of the common good.” 89
It may be that the society that is the Church will, for her
part, ordinarily do her work best without the aid of the state.
Other societies, however, and particularly the family, will
frequently need the assistance of the state, but from this it does
not follow that there is a deficiency on the part of the family:
[S]ubsidiarity does not per se imply a deficiency in the person or
office receiving the subsidium. The family receives help from
the wider political community, but that does not mean that the
family is itself “deficient”—rather it means that the family’s
unique munus does not constitute the entirety of the common
good, and it is entirely natural for the family to rely upon
institutions other than itself . . . . [S]ometimes there really is a
deficiency. A family, for example, can come apart at the seams,
and another power has to intervene to assist. . . . Subsidiarity
in this kind of case demands that the intervention have as its
goal the restoration rather than the absorption or elimination of
the function, mission, role of the institution being assisted. 90

Subsidiarity is an expression of pluralism, a principle of nonabsorption of one function by another. Further, as a principle for
harmonizing the plural social authorities and of providing aid as
necessary, it governs the interaction of all human societies,
including family and Church, toward the common good. In sum:
[T]he principle of subsidiary function, as a principle delimiting
Hittinger, Social Pluralism, supra note 8, at 59.
DIVINI REDEMPTORIS, supra note 85, ¶ 32.
89 Id.
90 Hittinger, Social Pluralism, supra note 8, at 59–60; see also J. Verstraeten,
Solidarity and Subsidiarity, in PRINCIPLES OF CATHOLIC SOCIAL TEACHING 133,
135–36 (David Boileau ed., 1994).
87
88
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social competencies, is an ontological principle, and because it
belongs to the ontological order of the common good itself, it is
not less an ontological principle than is the common good
principle: like the common good principle, it has its origin in the
unity of man’s personal and social nature, and its substance is
determined by the order of ends indicated thereby . . . .
...
. . . The principle of subsidiary function stands opposed to the
omnipotence of organizations just as it is opposed to the
omnipotence of the state. Because the subsidiary function
principle protects the particular rights of the natural and the
free associations against the state’s claim to omnicompetence, it
is a fundamental principle of the pluralistic society: the
subsidiary principle stands against the totalitarian claim of the
state to competence; the subsidiary principle is the natural
fundamental law of the free society, guaranteeing the particular
rights of “society” as distinct from the state. 91

Subsidiarity is not a mandate for either devolution or a
government handout; subsidiarity highlights obligation:
[T]he principle of subsidiary function also confers an
obligation . . . on the member societies and individuals, since it
protects their own competencies and rights. Nothing is gained
by merely appealing to the subsidiary function principle in reply
to the state’s tendency to expand. The competencies and rights
protected by the subsidiary function principle must be used with
vigor; the responsibilities underlying them as far as possible
must be fulfilled through one’s own power and initiative. 92

With these structural principles in mind, I turn now to the
specific societies—the specific group persons—that are my
present concern.
III. CHURCHES, SCHOOLS, FAMILIES: SUBSIDIARITY IN ACTION
The work of the society that is the Church might sometimes
benefit, as a matter of fact, from aid from the state; the works of
the distinct societies ordained within the Church might
sometimes benefit from, if not outright need (if they are to
succeed), the affirmative assistance of the state. In abjuring all
privileges for herself, as she does today, the Church by no means
denies the liceity of her receiving, on her own terms, aid from the
state. In the words of the Second Vatican Council in Dignitatis
91
92

MESSNER, supra note 68, at 210, 213.
Id. at 213.
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humanae:
The freedom of the Church is the fundamental principle
governing relations between the Church and public authorities
and the whole civil order. . . .
...
. . . The Church also claims freedom for herself as a society of
men with the right to live in civil society in accordance with the
demands of the Christian faith. 93

Certainly, this claim concerns the negative liberty of the
Church, but the Church also claims a positive right against the
state to have enacted into law and put into practice at least some
of the conditions necessary to the Church’s fulfilling her mission:
When the principle of religious freedom is not just proclaimed
in words or incorporated in law but is implemented sincerely in
practice, only then does the Church enjoy in law and in fact
those stable conditions which give her the independence
necessary for fulfilling her divine mission. 94

We need not linger over which positive conditions are to be
satisfied first, however, because, of course, the U.S. Constitution
as currently interpreted by the Supreme Court holds it lawful for
the state purposely or directly to aid religion. If, for example, the
legislature of the Commonwealth of Pennsylvania passed a
statute appropriating funds directly to the Institute of the
Brothers of the Christian Schools (along with a dozen other
Christian and non-Christians religious societies), it would violate
the Constitution as it is currently interpreted. The principle of
subsidiarity, which precedes the Constitution, is thus rendered
powerless to do its work. We can doubt whether ours is the
regime the Framers of the First Amendment sought and
anticipated, but it remains the dispensation within which we are
given to live—except, perhaps, in moments of legitimate advocacy
for a better interpretation of the Framers’ Constitution.
We can continue to complain that the state is failing to meet
its obligations to the Church, but more promising today is the
complaint that the state is failing in its obligation under
subsidiarity to help the family fulfill its function. It is the
mission of the family to be the primary educator of its children,
but many families will fail in that munus without help. Such
failure is the predictable outcome of a regime that pits (all but
93
94

DIGNITATIS HUMANAE, supra note 39, ¶ 13.
Id.
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rich) children against the state. A collateral consequence of this
failure is, of course, a frustration of the Church’s own work to
cooperate with parents in bringing children to salvation. The
constitutionally cognizable claim, however, is that parents have a
right that is not being honored, to wit, the (limited) right to direct
the education and upbringing of children in their charge. That
right is cognizable as part of our current constitutional regime,
thanks to Pierce, about which I shall have more to say below.
Catholic teaching on the function of the family is sufficiently
well-known that it will suffice here, starting from that munus, to
summarize the Catholic argument, first, against the current
individual-versus-state educational apparatus and, second, in
favor of a family-centered and subsidiarity-structured system of
education (in which the Church, too, will have an opportunity to
fulfill her munus vis-à-vis children). Though the Church’s
teaching begins from the respective munera of various societies,
the reader will observe that, for purposes of making claims for
positive protection and help, munera are sometimes translated
into the idiom of rights-and-duties. But make no mistake: At
root, what is at issue are plural and particular shares in the
divine ruling power, nothing less.
The family is a distinct society, with its own function, its own
corresponding duties and rights.
The family, the natural community in which human social
nature is experienced, makes a unique and irreplaceable
contribution to the good of society. The family unit, in fact, is
born from the communion of persons. “ ‘Communion’ has to
with the personal relationship between the ‘I’ and the ‘thou.’
‘Community’ on the other hand transcends this framework and
moves towards a ‘society,’ a ‘we.’ The family, as a community of
persons, is the first human ‘society.’ ”
...
The priority of the family over society and over the State must be
affirmed. The family in fact, at least in its procreative function,
is the condition itself for their existence. With regard to other
functions that benefit each of its members, it . . . [precedes] in
importance and value the functions that society and the State
are called to perform. The family possesses inviolable rights
and finds its legitimization in human nature and not in being
recognized by the State. The family, then, does not exist for
society or for the State, but society and the State exist for the
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family. 95
Parents hold the duty and therefore the right to be the primary
educators of their children.
The right and duty of parents to educate their children is
essential, since it is connected with the transmission of human
life; it is original and primary with regard to the educational
role of others, on account of the uniqueness of the loving
relationship between parents and children; and it is
irreplaceable and inalienable, and therefore incapable of being
entirely delegated to others or usurped by others. 96

Parents have a duty and right to give their children, and
children have a right to receive, education that conforms to the
parents’ religious convictions.
Parents are the first educators, not the only educators, of their
children.
It belongs to them, therefore, to exercise with
responsibility their educational activity in close and vigilant
cooperation with civil and ecclesial agencies. . . . Parents have
the right to choose the formative tools that respond to their
convictions and to seek those means that will help them best to
fulfil[l] their duty as educators, in the spiritual and religious
sphere also. 97

The state is under a duty to respect parents as the primary
educators of children and, observing the principles of distributive
justice, to assist parents as needed.
The civil authority must . . . recognize the right of parents to
choose with genuine freedom schools or other means of
education. Parents should not be subjected directly or indirectly
to unjust burdens because of this freedom of choice. 98
Public authorities have the duty to guarantee this right [of
parents to be the primary educators of their children] and to
ensure the concrete conditions necessary for it to be exercised. 99
Parents, who have a primary and inalienable duty and right in
regard to the education of their children, should enjoy the
fullest liberty in their choice of school. The public authority,
therefore, whose duty it is to protect and defend the liberty of
95
96
97
98
99

COMPENDIUM, supra note 59, at ¶¶ 213–14.
Id. ¶ 239.
COMPENDIUM, supra note 59, ¶ 240.
DIGNITATIS HUMANAE, supra note 39, ¶ 5.
COMPENDIUM, supra note 59, ¶ 240.
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the citizens, is bound according to the principles of distributive
justice to ensure that public subsidies to schools are so allocated
that parents are truly free to select schools for their children in
accordance with their conscience. 100

The refusal to provide public economic support to non-public
schools that need assistance and that render a service to civil
society is to be considered an injustice. “Whenever the State lays
claim to an educational monopoly, it oversteps its rights and
offends justice. . . . The State cannot without injustice merely
tolerate so-called private schools. Such schools render a public
service and therefore have a right to financial assistance.” 101
The state is obligated under the correlative principle of
subsidiarity, which has both positive and negative dimensions, to
come to the aid of societies in need:
Subsidiarity, understood in the positive sense as economic,
institutional or juridical assistance offered to lesser social
entities, entails a corresponding series of negative implications
that require the State to refrain from anything that would de
facto restrict the existential space of the smaller essential cells
of society. Their initiative, freedom and responsibility must not
be supplanted. 102
In their relationship to the family, society and the State are
seriously obligated to observe the principle of subsidiarity. In
virtue of this principle, public authorities may not take away
from the family tasks which it can accomplish well by itself or in
free association with other families; on the other hand, these
same authorities have the duty to sustain the family, ensuring
that it has all the assistance that it needs to fulfil[l] properly its
responsibilities. 103

This line of reasoning will be well-nigh incomprehensible to
those who suppose that education is intrinsically the work of the
state and that, when non-state actors are permitted to
administer schools, we witness no more than the state’s opting to
outsource what remains essentially its own work. But if we
100 VATICAN
COUNCIL II, DECLARATION ON CHRISTIAN EDUCATION
GRAVISSIMUM EDUCATIONIS ¶ 6 (1965), reprinted in VATICAN COUNCIL II, supra note
33, at 731 [hereinafter GRAVISSIMUM EDUCATIONIS].
101 COMPENDIUM, supra note 59, ¶ 241.
102 Id. ¶ 186.
103 Id. ¶ 214.
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start, as the Church teaches us to start, by recognizing the
existence of plural societies, their respective munera, and
subsidiarity understood as an ontological principle of plural
social forms and a duty of non-usurping assistance. Then, if we
come to children within this context of the divinely ordained
societies that are Church and family, we will be in the position to
specify and respect the place of religious schools in the overall
mix and motion of civil society as a whole. Such societies as
schools are not mere concessions of the state; they belong, as a
natural right, though subject to regulation on behalf of the
common good, to those who wish to create and administer them
in fulfillment of their respective munera.
The reason that schools may be subject to regulation is,
again, that the schools’ efforts do not exhaust the conditions
necessary to achievement of the common good of all. The state’s
particular function is the one of realizing the truly common good
of civil society, and it will do so in part by respecting and, as
necessary, regulating and coordinating the efforts of the plural
societies that both precede it and co-exist within it.
The principle of subsidiarity is what brings the functions of the
state into the perspective of the actual common good. This is
characterized by the fact that the political community is an
association of individual and social persons with their own
existential ends and their corresponding tasks, rights, and
powers, who can reach their essential self-fulfillment only by
complying with the corresponding responsibilities implied in
these ends. The state is the institution for coordinating these
powers and activities for the good of all. 104

If the Church could stick to her spiritual knitting, she would
thereby reduce the occasions and opportunities for governmental
regulation of her ecclesial munera; under our constitutional
dispensation, secure is the freedom to believe in what one wishes
in his condominium. But the Church’s munus includes concrete
actions in the world, and through her works in fulfillment of her
munus, the Church invites occasions for regulation in view of the
common good. Those who care about the success and integrity of
the Church’s activities are right to worry lest the “strings” that
come attached to benefits received from government bind the
hands of the Church and frustrate her mission. 105 But the
104
105

MESSNER, supra note 68, at 630.
Cf. Vischer, Principle of Governance, supra note 6, at 115 (“[R]easonable
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ontological principle of subsidiarity denies that plural societies
should be autonomous societies.
Over their long history,
Lasallian schools have been the beneficiaries and disbeneficiaries of countless regimes. When the conditions a
particular regime imposes would vitiate the Lasallian work,
Lasallians are free to close up shop, as it were, and pursue their
munera elsewhere. It is no secret that the Church is finding
more fertile mission territories than, say, Greenwich, CT, or Palo
Alto, CA. The question I am pursuing here is what those who
care about children, families, the Church, and the Lasallians in
particular should pursue today in the United States. Again,
munera and the principle of subsidiarity put these societies—
these group persons—under an obligation to do their respective
tasks “with vigor.”
IV. SERIOUSLY?
Obviously enough, though I have yet to make the point
explicit, my normative argument tends toward a proximate
appeal to expand “school choice.” The Constitution is for the
moment interpreted to allow the state to provide some indirect
assistance to religious schools, so long as it does so in a way that
is neutral with respect to religion. 106 The rule of Zelman respects
and begins to give concrete effect to the principle of Pierce,
according to which our Constitution guarantees the “liberty of
parents and guardians to direct the upbringing and education of
children.” 107 In the view of the Pierce Court, “The child is not the
mere creature of the state; those who nurture him and direct his
destiny have the right, coupled with the high duty, to recognize
and prepare him for additional obligations.” 108 Pierce was
decided on substantive due process, not First Amendment,

minds differ as to the precise contours of the line between government and marketbased solutions to social problems . . . .”).
106 Zelman v. Simmons-Harris, 536 U.S. 639, 662–63 (2002) (“In sum, the Ohio
program is entirely neutral with respect to religion. It provides benefits directly to a
wide spectrum of individuals, defined only by financial need and residence in a
particular school district. It permits such individuals to exercise genuine choice
among options public and private, secular and religious. The program is therefore a
program of true private choice. In keeping with an unbroken line of decisions
rejecting challenges to similar programs, we hold that the program does not offend
the Establishment Clause.”).
107 Pierce v. Soc’y of Sisters, 268 U.S. 510, 534–35 (1925).
108 Id. at 535.
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grounds, and it may well be that our Supreme Court has “yet to
come up with a good theory to explain its holding in Pierce.” 109
But if the Court is still in search of a theory as it goes forward
giving effect to Pierce (as it did in Zelman), Catholics are already
possessed of a theory that gives them reason, as Richard Garnett
says, “to take Pierce seriously.” 110 And if, with Professor Garnett,
we do take Pierce seriously, and for the reasons I have been
developing,
[W]e should then say that state functionaries, guided and
restrained by a proper humility about their authority and
competence, should meddle with parents’ educational decisions
only to prevent harm, very carefully defined, to a child. That is,
they should not intervene simply whenever they think intrusion
or oversight would serve the Government’s notion of the child’s
‘best interests’ or its own perceived need and claimed
prerogative to create a certain kind of citizen. 111

Professor Garnett continues immediately thereafter in a
footnote:
In my view, government ‘intervention’ in the family is
intervention. [James Dwyer takes a different view:] “[T]he
reality is that the family is not a separate, primordial sphere
that is or can be cordoned off from the power of the state. Quite
the opposite. The law creates the family, and things could not
be otherwise . . . .” But this is not ‘the reality.’ The law no more
‘creates’ the family than the Rule Against Perpetuities ‘creates’
dirt. 112

Catholics should find it easy to, and they should be hopeful
that legislators and the Court will, take Pierce seriously. The
future of the Lasallian munus in the U.S., to say nothing of the
fate of countless non-rich families and their children, would seem
to depend upon it, or at least on the expansion of “school choice.”
For some three decades, the combined voice of Professors
John Coons and Steven Sugarman has commended “school
choice” to us on quite plausible grounds. Coons and Sugarman
argue that parents should be enabled to choose their children’s
109 Richard W. Garnett, Taking Pierce Seriously: The Family, Religious
Education, and Harm to Children, 76 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 109, 112 n.21 (2000).
110 Id. at 114.
111 Id.
112 Id. at 114 n.29 (quoting James G. Dwyer, Spiritual Treatment Exemptions to
Child Medical Neglect Laws: What We Outsiders Should Think, 76 NOTRE DAME L.
REV. 147, 167 (2000)).
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schools because they ordinarily know their children better than
anyone else, ordinarily care about their children more than
anyone else, and are accountable for their children as is no one
else. 113 In its elaborated forms, this argument has been one of
the prime movers in the movement that has begun to turn
people’s attention to the exigence of school choice. If we have
reason to be grateful for this development, we should at least be
wary of the underside of the argument from the utility of
parental choice. “The state” is all too happy to calculate utility
and ensure that it is maximized according to principles of its own
choosing. For Catholics, however, the reason for making the
state responsible to families is not any assessment of utility or
calculation of consequences; it is, rather, that the society that is
the family is intransitively “the first and vital cell of society.” 114
Its munus is given. If it happens that a particular family cannot
perform its function, subsidiarity will require aid to that family,
with a view toward restoring it, if possible, to proper functioning.
Furthermore, for the reasons developed above, it is no
argument for centralizing state control that the ordinary state of
affairs will require aid to the family. The family’s munus does
not exhaust the common good, and it is the ratio essendi of the
state to coordinate and assist primary societies with a view
toward their own respective goods and toward the common good
of all. 115 Again, the right of the family to perform its essential
function is in no way the contingent product of a predictive
calculation of its wisdom or practicality, nor is it attenuated or
vitiated by its need for help. As Professor Garnett suggests,
113 See, e.g., JOHN E. COONS & STEPHEN D. SUGARMAN, EDUCATION BY CHOICE:
THE CASE FOR FAMILY CONTROL 52–61 (1978); JOHN E. COONS & STEPHEN D.
SUGARMAN, MAKING SCHOOL CHOICE WORK FOR ALL FAMILIES subdiv. I (1999),
available
at
http://www.pacificresearch.org/pub/sab/educat/making_choice/main2.html.
114 COMPENDIUM, supra note 59, ¶ 211.
115

In the first place comes the family, instituted directly by God for its
peculiar purpose, the generation and formation of offspring; for this reason
it has priority of nature and therefore of rights over civil society.
Nevertheless, the family is an imperfect society, since it has not in itself all
the means for its own complete development; whereas civil society is a
perfect society, having in itself all the means for its peculiar end, which is
the temporal well-being of the community; and so, in this respect, that is, in
view of the common good, it has pre-eminence over the family, which finds
its own suitable temporal perfection precisely in civil society.
DIVINI ILLIUS MAGISTRI, supra note 26, ¶ 12 (1929).
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Perhaps Pierce and the cluster of values and maxims for which
it is thought to stand are best defended not in terms of parents’
individual ‘rights’ against government, and certainly not in
terms of ownership and property, but instead in terms of
subsidiarity . . . . On this view, the State properly refrains from
second-guessing families on matters of education and the
transmission of religious tradition not only out of respect for the
religious freedom and parental authority of the individuals
situated within those families, but also out of wise regard for
those families’ integrity and health, precisely because the
integrity and freedom of these ‘vital cells’ is important to the
common good. 116

From where Professor Garnett leaves off I would only add,
and I trust he would agree, that it is the antecedent munus of the
family that calls for this result.
In the context of the above observations about the family,
Professor Garnett observes and approves the potentially
“subversive” effect of societies, such as the family, that mediate
between the state and individuals. 117 Such subversion of statist
claims occurs when the family’s insistence upon fulfillment of its
munus (in concert, we might add, with the Church’s fulfillment of
her own) forces itself upon the state and insinuates itself into the
life of civil society. Civil society and its agent, the state, are thus
made to recognize and serve the antecedent societies and their
respective munera. It is the givenness of the munera that
entitles them to respect and, if necessary, aid. Subsidiarity does
not assign these functions; recognizing and respecting them, it
insists upon aid to meet societies’ given responsibilities. We will
be able to take Pierce seriously if we recognize that education is
primarily (though not exclusively) the work of a group person
that is not the creation of the state.
“[I]f we take subsidiarity seriously,” Professor Robert Vischer
has argued, “we will be very cautious in collectivizing our
conception of the good.” 118 For all the reasons I have been
developing, one should want to take subsidiarity seriously. In
Hittinger’s phrase, it is a principle derivative of basic social
justice; or, as Messner prefers to say, it is an ontological
Garnett, supra note 109, at 144–45.
Id. at 145–46.
118 Robert K. Vischer, Subsidiarity as Subversion: Local Power, Legal Norms,
and the Liberal State, 2 J. CATH. SOC. THOUGHT 277, 309 (2005) [hereinafter
Vischer, Subversion] (emphasis added).
116
117
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principle. 119
What, then, does Professor Vischer ask of us if we are to take
subsidiarity seriously? Professor Vischer is wary of a spineless
subsidiarity:
Standing alone, subsidiarity can be read simply as calling for
social problems to be addressed at the local level to the extent
local bodies can address a given problem effectively.
Understood as a strictly political principle, the only grounds for
dispute will be over the normative definition and empirical
verification of effectiveness. Beyond that, the doctrine seems so
broadly stated as to be of nearly universal appeal. 120

With this observation, I agree—but, of course, subsidiarity
never does “stand alone,” at least it does not in the eyes of
traditional Catholic social thought. Professor Vischer is right to
warn that, “shorn from its surrounding web of truth claims,”
subsidiarity will be “vulnerabl[e] to secular domestication.” 121
But what is this surrounding web of truth claims of which
Vischer speaks? Does it contain munera? Participated shares in
the divine rule?
On Vischer’s account, subsidiarity is “doubly subversive:
[first,] it subverts the state’s efforts to collectivize individualist
norms,” 122 as Garnett observed. Second, according to Vischer, “it
also may subvert religious voices’ efforts to collectivize norms
grounded in the moral anthropology.” 123
Professor Vischer
continues:
“[F]or subsidiarity to continue facilitating the
common good as conceived of by Catholic social teaching, society
must be persuaded to make room for multiple conceptions of the
good, not simply seek to collectivize the Church’s
anthropologically authentic conception.” 124
If the point being made were that there exist today
prudential reasons for tolerating in civil society the
implementation of conceptions of the good for man that diverge
from those taught by the Catholic magisterium, I should have to
agree. But that is not Professor Vischer’s point. “Substantively,”
according to Professor Vischer, “subsidiarity looks for power to be
119 MESSNER, supra note 68, at 135; see Hittinger, Social Pluralism, supra note
8, at 55–58.
120 Vischer, Subversion, supra note 118, at 277.
121 Id. at 278.
122 Id. at 279.
123 Id.
124 Id. at 278.
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exercised . . . with the ultimate aim . . . of furthering authentic
human development.” 125 That is as committal as I have found
Vischer to be in print; one looks in vain for munera, the given
functions of group persons, in Professor Vischer’s social ontology.
Furthermore, instead of identifying and, as needed, assisting the
authority that attends the proper discharge of a munus,
subsidiarity in Professor Vischer’s hands is made to stand
against implementing, from the ground up, the common good as
Catholics understand it:
If we claim that subsidiarity renders localization in a particular
context valid only to the extent that the local body’s approach
contributes to the common good, as defined by the truth claims
of the moral anthropology [of the Church], we have emptied
subsidiarity of its real-world meaning. If localization’s validity
is measured against a standard derived from a contested vision
of the good, subsidiarity becomes a simple prop, justifying
whatever vision of the good happens to hold sway in the
political and legal spheres. 126

As understood in the tradition of Catholic social thought,
subsidiarity is not a principle that justifies subversion of claims
on behalf of universal truths about the good for human and group
persons. Magisterial Catholic social thought affirms plural
societies and their respective authorities, and it does this on the
ground that each possesses a munus proprium, a share in the
divine rule, which, as the ontological principle subsidiarity
attests, is irreducibly its own in concert with other genuine
societies. Though it must be admitted that Catholic authors as
well as others have said all manner of things about what
subsidiarity amounts to, I read the Roman documents without
finding a hint that subsidiarity is a principle of “value
pluralism.” 127 The pluralism that is implicated and affirmed by
subsidiarity is a plurality of authorities, and authority for its
Id. at 279.
Id. at 309 (alteration in original). Which is not to deny, of course, that the
Church affirms that concrete instantiation of the good can take myriad forms.
127 Id. at 306. A less than precise application of the principle of subsidiary
function occurs in the generally excellent The Catholic School on the Threshold of the
Third Millennium: “A correct relationship between state and school, not only a
Catholic school, is based not so much on institutional relations as on the right of
each person to receive a suitable education of their free choice. This right is
acknowledged according to the principle of subsidiarity.” Congregation for Catholic
Education, The Catholic School on the Threshold of the Third Millennium,
L’OSSERVATORE ROMANO, Apr. 22, 1998, ¶ 17.
125
126
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part, is discoverable in a particular society exactly to the extent
that it is ordained immediately to its own good and mediately to
the common good. Any genuine authority is a share in divine
providence, and the legitimacy of its exercise depends upon its
being ordered to the good of individuals, group persons, and the
common good. In the words of the Catechism, which I quoted
above:
God has not willed to reserve to himself all exercise of power.
He entrusts to every creature the functions [munera] it is
capable of performing, according to the capacities of its own
nature. This mode of governance ought to be followed in social
life. The way God acts in governing the world, which bears
witness to such great regard for human freedom, should inspire
the wisdom of those who govern human communities. They
should behave as ministers of divine providence. 128

Or as St. Thomas says, the human person participates in the
divine governance in a particularly excellent way, being
provident for himself, and this includes the opportunity and
exigence to order all human living to the good, including the
common good, and ultimately the separate common good that is
God. 129 Circumstances will dictate what is possible, but no
principle of Catholic thought—and certainly not subsidiarity—
carves out pockets of lawlessness in the name of “value
pluralism.”
V. MAKING WAY FOR THE LASALLIAN MISSION
How many American Catholics would be willing to affirm
that “[s]ince it is the parents who have given life to their
children, on them lies the gravest obligation of educating their
family”? 130 The quoted language comes from the Second Vatican
Council, but many Catholics are more likely to call it Amish than
they are to own it. Many older Catholics will remember, of
course, that Catholics are supposed to see that their children go
to Catholic schools, but by now most Catholics seem to be, like
the rest of the population, ready to eat meat on Fridays and let
“the state” government do what it will with its schools and their
children—so long, that is, as parents lucky enough to be able to
afford religious (or other) schools can “opt out.” Though we
128
129
130

CATECHISM, supra note 59, ¶ 1884 (alteration in original).
SUMMA THEOLOGIAE, supra note 69, pt. I–II, Q. 91, art. 2, at 997.
GRAVISSIMUM EDUCATIONIS, supra note 100, ¶ 3.
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manage episodic (if temperate) outrage at the current state of
affairs, most Americans, including Catholics, seem to be largely
comfortable with the reality that parents who are unlucky
enough to be poor or low-income have no “choice” but the local
public schools, even though those schools frequently are—and
there can be no serious dispute about the relevant facts—
abysmal. Poor parents are denied the practical opportunity to
meet this “gravest obligation,” yet protest is hardly heard. While
rich parents go on choosing their children’s education (whether it
be at Sidwell Friends, say, or Portsmouth Abbey), poor and lowincome parents have no “choice” but to watch their children be
conscripted by failing public schools. According to the Second
Vatican Council,
All people of whatever race, condition or age, in virtue of their
dignity as human persons, have an inalienable right to
education. This education should be suitable to the particular
destiny of the individuals, adapted to their ability, sex and
national cultural traditions . . . . True education aims to give
people a formation which is directed towards their final end and
the good of that society to which they belong and in which, as
adults, they will have their share of duties to perform . 131

Is this right to a true education no part of the American
Catholic consciousness? Why can American Catholics not come
together in defense of the munus of the family and the correlative
principle of subsidiarity as the criteria governing authentic
parental choice over how, where, and by whom their children are
to be educated? Judged against the right and duty of all families
to be the primary providers of an education shaped by the
parents according to their view of the final end, and against the
right of all children to receive such an education, the American
educational system and state of affairs deserve a failing grade.
Period. Except to say that acquiescence in this moral abdication
is a scandal that goes scandalously unrecognized.
“Education is the process and vocation of shaping souls.” 132
Id. ¶ 1.
Richard W. Garnett, The Story of Henry Adams’s Soul: Education and the
Expression of Associations, 85 MINN. L. REV. 1841, 1882 (2001); see also Michael
Scaperlanda, Realism, Freedom, and the Integral Development of the Human Person:
A Catholic View of Education, 44 J. CATH. LEGAL STUD. 65, 76 (2005) (“[T]he
Catholic Church envisions a dynamic interplay among the parents, religious
institutions, and the state in providing each child with an education. Each
institution—i.e., family, Church, and state—has its own unique and complementary
131
132
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The work La Salle and his Institute made their own was made
necessary by poor families’ structural inability to meet their
vocation to their children. Saint La Salle described the Brothers’
work as “one of the most important and most necessary services
in the church, one entrusted to [them] by pastors and by fathers
and mothers.” 133 Their “holy ministry,” La Salle taught his
Brothers, is nothing less than to “fulfill the function of guardian
angels” for the children entrusted to them. 134 “You share in the
ministry of the guardian angels by making known to children the
truths of the gospel, which God has chosen you to announce . . . .
This is why Jesus Christ has sent you and why the church, whose
ministers you are, employs you.” 135 Those whom “God has
entrusted . . . with so holy a ministry . . . he will summon . . . for
a very exact account on the day of judgment.” 136
Eliminating the systemic injustice in the American
educational apparatus requires realigning and harmonizing, for
the first time in a long time in the American experiment, the
societies that are Church, family, and school, and putting the
state to work for those societies and the persons whom they
nurture. Nearly all the relevant cultural vectors are headed in
the wrong direction, and their magnitude is growing. The idea
that above all leads, when acted upon, to a systemic stifling of
the Lasallian initiative—or, more broadly, to poor parents’
opportunity to fulfill their educational duty to their children—is
the idea that rightful authority comes from the state down,
rather from creation and redemption to individuals and specific
societies as shares in the divine ruling power. The cultural
situation we confront has more in common with La Salle’s world
than first meets the eye. La Salle knew, and we are reminded in
the Compendium of the Social Doctrine of the Church, that
society is built properly when it is “built on a family scale.” 137
Righting the educational injustice in our nation requires giving
effect to a principle that is terribly out of tune with our
globalizing, homogenizing, straitening tendencies:
Plural
societies—plural group persons—possessed of their respective
role to play in the formation of the child.”).
133 KOCH, supra note 36, at 53.
134 Id. at 47.
135 Id. at 51, 55.
136 Id. at 49–50.
137 COMPENDIUM, supra note 59, ¶ 213.
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munera are to be given subsidium, both the respect they deserve
and what help they require.

